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1. Introduction 
Climate clubs have emerged as a possible strategy to overcome the impasses, which the 
multilateral negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) have experienced in tackling climate change. ‘Clubs’ are 
‘minilateral’ subsets of countries with possibly higher potential for resolving some of 
these impasses than the multilateral process as a whole. While the negotiations 
themselves address both the causes and consequences of anthropogenic climate change, 
as well as the means to do so, clubs proposals generally only address mitigation, and are 
usually structured around the problem of ‘ambition’ – achieving commitments from 
countries to limit and/or reduce their emissions sufficiently to avoid human induced 
climatic change. 
Clubs have been advanced to achieve various objectives. The most common one 
is perhaps to break the ‘deadlock’ over mitigation ambition by establishing a club of 
major emitters, which could agree on both ambitious targets and appropriate sanctions. 
In addition, there are other forms of clubs which could be established to advance 
innovation and implementation in various elements of the global mitigation effort; for 
instance, reporting and review processes, finance, technology development etc. Theories 
on clubs vary to the extent to which clubs augment or replace the multilateral process. 
Most of the literature focuses on the potential for clubs to resolve problems which appear 
to be insoluble under the multilateral process; in practice, there are many club-like 
structures which currently argument the multilateral process, which will also be discussed 
below. 
The underlying idea suggests that countries committed to reducing emissions can 
advance a stable coalition in the form of a club with other countries (for example, 
Nordhaus 2015). As a result more countries would possibly put forth targets for more 
ambitious emissions reductions (for instance, Grubb et al 2015) and / or take other 
actions associated with enhanced mitigation action. The practice and theory in 
international relations shows that club governance requires a solid national interest to 
sustain clubs (Schneckener 2009). Club governance is a small niche in the social science 
and economics, which has gained relevance in the analysis of climate policy. Most 
analyses focus on the club design and factors for success and failures of minilateralist 
approaches, rather than analyzing dynamics in individual countries for joining or leaving 
clubs. 
The developments in Paris at COP 21 change the debate on clubs in a number of key 
areas: i) individual county contributions will be nationally-determined for the foreseeable 
future – in other words, there will not be a top-down allocation of mitigation effort; ii) 
countries will be required to consider the global impact of all contributions in making 
theirs; iii) countries will be obliged (Parties “shall”) to develop domestic policies which 
are demonstrably capable of meeting their ‘contributions’; iv) countries will be obliged to 
report on progress in meeting their ‘contributions’. These changes prioritize domestic 
climate efforts over any international allocation regime. For this reason, perspectives on 
the national contributions gain critical relevance to solving the climate problem. 
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This paper adds to the literature on the potential contribution of ‘climate clubs’ to 
the resolution of the global climate problem via an analysis of South Africa’s potential 
involvement in various types of climate club, and what such involvement is likely to lead 
to in terms of the various goals outlined in the literature review below. South Africa has a 
number of interesting characteristics as a participant in the international climate process; 
it is classified as a middle-income country, and is a non-Annex I country under the 
UNFCCC. Its history and its role as a pre-eminent African economy has shaped an 
international profile which outweighs the size of its economy or its population. Post-
apartheid foreign policy has sought to balance historical political and economic 
relationships with the EU and the USA, with on the one hand a foreign policy 
emphasising regional co-operation, playing a major role in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), and on the other hand 
a policy of engagement with major developing countries via BRICS and BASIC. South 
Africa chaired the G77+China in 2015, and a South African currently heads the AU.   
South Africa’s national interests in this context are complex. South Africa is a 
major coal producer and exporter, and the country has one of the most coal-dependent 
economies in the world. Its economy is not only heavily dependent on coal, but also 
characterised by a large mining and minerals processing industry, which is very energy-
intensive. By contrast to the emissions profile of many other developing countries, South 
Africa has an insignificant land sector, and its emissions are dominated by energy 
emissions at around 80% of the total. At the same time, South Africa’s climatic 
conditions render it extremely vulnerable to impacts of climate change, and high levels of 
inequality combined with extensive poverty both pose urgent development challenges, 
and increase the population’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.  
The purpose of the analysis is to identify if and how South Africa can possibly 
contribute to advancing ambition in climate clubs. Furthermore, it advances ideas about 
possible design options for climate clubs that may appeal to developing countries. 1 
2. Literature Review: Club governance and minilateralism in climate policy 
The literature on climate clubs falls into two categories. We call the first category carbon-
pricing clubs, which operate under the assumption that there is a strong and enforceable 
agreement between participating countries. These models for climate clubs are inspired 
by economic theory on international public goods. Theories on public goods establish the 
criteria of rivalry and non-rivalry in consumption and exclusive or universal access to the 
consumption of a good. While public goods are accessible to everyone and non-rival in 
their consumption, access to private goods is restricted. The theory of clubs vis a vis 
public goods is to establish exclusivity by establishing a proxy private good within the 
club. For instance, Nordhaus (2015) advocates a form of carbon tax for club members, 
coupled with border tax adjustments imposed on non-club members. In this case, the 
                                                       
1 This ongoing research is part of a project on “a pioneer’s alliance” jointly lead by the German 
Development and Wuppertal Institutes. 
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public good is still accessible to non-members (avoiding climate change), but at the cost 
of the loss of a private good (trade / access to global markets on favourable terms). 
Economic research has advanced club theory mainly on national public goods, like 
public roads or recreational areas that can be limited in access (Buchanan 1965, Sandler 
and Tschirhardt 1980). Some clubs in the climate arena may not have these 
characteristics, which is discussed further below. In climate change, the public good in 
question is the avoidance of dangerous climate change, which translates directly into 
limiting global emissions in the near future to a level which would require transformation 
of the global economy. This is non-exclusive in the sense that reduction of a unit of 
emissions anywhere is equivalent; thus free riders would benefit in the same way as those 
who bear the burden of emissions reduction. The real problem is not simply reducing 
emissions, but doing so in a way, which meets a range of complex social, political and 
economic objectives. Although many of these are common to all or most countries, 
many of these are not. Furthermore, while mitigation is traditionally assumed to impose 
a straightforward cost 2 , it is increasingly apparent that the kind of economic 
transformation which low-carbon development will require will also create vast new, and 
potentially very competitive industries. These characteristics of the mitigation problem 
suggest that although the type of club structured around the simple notion of public 
goods outlined above may be effective, if politically plausible.  
The literature on climate clubs in the literature from international relations have 
generally been proposed to address and overcome problems perceived to be inherent in 
the international climate negotiation process, specifically the cumbersome and ill-defined 
process of decision-making based on consensus3. These are in turn of two kinds: a) the 
challenge of consensual decision-making processes amongst all UN member states, 
which opens the process to potential vetos by countries with minority views; and b) the 
associated challenge of negotiating innovative and complex solutions to the climate 
problem in such a large forum. Thus, club proposals seek to address both the process of 
reaching agreement on climate action, and also the process of innovation required to 
establish an apropriate international regime to tackle the climate change problem.  
Falkner [ref] identifies three variants on climate clubs in the literature: 
1. “enhancing political dialogue and bargaining” by taking the negotiations process 
out of the formal UNFCCC setting, removing the pressures and constraints of the 
formal process, and allowing more latitude for building mutual trust and 
understanding, including via restricting participation to key actors. 
2. This variant would go beyond (1) by “creating membership-specific incentives” 
and sanctions attached to possibly binding mitigation targets within the club; 
3. This variant would formalise “great power cooperation” in the context of the 
multilateral regime and effectively create a subset of the multilateral process in 
which major emitters would be able to agree on key tradeoffs necessary for more 
ambitious targets. 
                                                       
2 The so-called McKinsey cost curve is the simplest portrayal of this, but even the cost curve often 
has ‘negative’ costs. In reality the cost curve hides a range of complex factors. 
3 Rules of procedure were proposed but never agreed under the UNFCCC. 
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Falkner’s (2016) overview suggests international legitimation as an additional aspect in 
his analysis of climate club governance. International legitimation matters for a climate 
club, as it doesn’t aim to undermine the current regime. The aim for positive externalities 
addresses this aspect. Legitimation results from shared beliefs. Here, again, a club with 
more members can contribute to higher legitimation. Yet, given the differences in 
emissions profiles and wealth between nations, it’ll depend who is in the club to attract or 
put other members off.   
Climate clubs are smaller complexes in a wider regime full of complexities, 
according to Keohane and Victor (2011). The authors argue that the climate change 
regime doesn’t consist of one regime, but a regime complex that comprises many 
different negotiations. These loosely connected sets of regimes may be conflicting or 
mutually reinforcing. Under these conditions a comprehensive climate regime will be less 
likely to be successful in achieving the required emissions reductions. The problems that 
need to be solved are too different to be successfully addressed in one regime (Keohane 
and Victor 2011). If smaller regime complexes, or clubs, will be successful for climate 
protection depends on six criteria, some of which link up with previous suggestions:  
1. Coherence: the regime complex or clubs needs to be compatible with other 
objectives, so that it does not create conflict or harm.  
2. Accountability: some actors can hold others accountable for to complying with 
the agreed rules and standards, which relates to governance  
3. Determinacy: firm rules of the club to reduce uncertainties and enhance 
compliance.  
4. Sustainability: long term commitment to the rules is necessary to attract 
membership  
5. Epistemic quality: the quality of consistency between rules and knowledge 
between members matters for the legitimacy and effectiveness 
6. Fairness: necessity to reflect the differences in financial resources and emissions 
profile.  
Novelty is another important factor that the authors establish in their analysis, but not 
listed as a criteria. There is trade-off between creating new clubs versus using existing 
structures is that new clubs require higher transaction cost, while existing clubs have 
lower transaction costs but the expectations and opinions on these clubs, members and 
their functionality has already been formed (Keohane and Victor 2011). 
These criteria raise some new aspects and overlap with others, which have 
already been established in the research literature. The table below summarizes the main 
determinants of success and failure of climate club governance. Each factor can create 
trade-offs, which require careful decision in the club design.  
 
Figure 1 Determinants of success and failure of clubs 
Factor High cost standards Low cost standards 
Benefits Cooperation benefits for every 
club member, non-rival club 
goods, private gains may be 
High externalities Lower externalities, total depending 
on total club members 
  7 
related 
Costs Contribution of dues, 
membership cost 
High membership 
cost off putting 
Low membership cost attracts more 
members 
Size Number of members may 






Large group of members, lower cost, 
possibly less optimal outcomes 
Commitment  Stability of the club, so that no 




on the benefits 
No explicit conclusion, the outcome 
depends on the benefits 





Membership and exclusion 
rules 
Exclusion of non-
members at high 
cost for members 
less beneficial for 
the functionality of 
the club 
Exclusion of non-members at low 
cost for members more beneficial for 
the functionality of the club  Determinacy of rules matters 
to reduce uncertainties and 
increase compliance  





Shared belief that club 
membership is worthwhile and 
compatible with other efforts 
Low, as fewer 
members join 
High, as more members may join  
Epistemic quality (Like 
mindedness) 
Low, if lower 
income countries 
can’t access 
High, if lower income countries can 
join 
Fairness Low, as high cost 
excludes lower 
income countries 





Many different negotiations in 
the climate change regime 
complexes 
Depends on core 
issues of the club  
Depends on core issues of the club 
Novelty Existing vs. new club Higher transaction 
cost for new clubs 
Lower transaction cost for existing 
structures 
 
Source: own compilation based on Nordhaus (2015), Prakash and Potosky (2007), 
Falkner (2016), Keohane and Victor (2011). 
 
Further literature assessed the nature of various existing climate clubs. The variety of the 
existing clubs reflects the breadth of issues in the current climate regime. For an overview 
see Weischer et al (2012) who distinguish between dialogue forums and implementation 
groups. Widerberg and Stenson (2013) assess the landscape of existing clubs according to 
their compatibility with the UNFCCC regime.  
For the purposes of this paper we divide current ‘clubs’ into four categories – 1) to 
develop and pursue common positions; 2) to develop consensus around specific technical 
areas, 3) to promote dialogue between “great powers” in a less formal setting on key 
issues; and 4), carbon-pricing clubs with the ability to penalize non-compliant members 
and to create an economic disadvantage for non-members, as a counter-factual. The first 
are clubs, which play a role in developing, deploying and pursuing negotiating positions 
within the UNFCCC process itself. These groups of countries meet regularly at or 
outside UNFCCC meetings, co-ordinate common positions on key issues, and work 
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collectively to promote these positions in the negotiations. The function of these groups 
is not only to aid countries in pursuing collective interests, but also to a) simplify the 
negotiations process, b) act as fora for innovation, and c) help to resolve differences via 
intergroup dialogue. Second are technically-focused groups which generally operate with 
reference to the UNFCCC, but operate outside the UNFCCC process per se, and are 
aimed at policy innovation and addressing differences in specific areas within the 
negotiations – for instance REDD. Third, “great power” groups, which usually consist of 
major emitters, and are aimed at promoting dialogue between a limited number of of key 
actors in a less formal setting than the UNFCCC. Fourth, carbon-pricing clubs, which 
would work best when there is regime with a low cost penalty in form of modest carbon 
prices as opposed to a regime with high or no penalties, according to Nordhaus (2015). 
His example assumes an international carbon price, which can be lowered between club 
members. The study shows that even penalties can still lead to significant emissions 
reductions. The underlying assumption in this analysis is the one of a classic economic 
club that works as long as members want to be part of the club and they can exclude non-
members at relatively low cost (Nordhaus, 2015). He states that “..the present study finds 
that without sanctions there is no stable climate coalition other than the non-cooperative, 
low-abatement coalition”; he uses the Kyoto Protocol as an example of the latter. 
Nordhaus’ version of a climate club would thus require quite an ambitious international 
agreement (albeit amongst a smaller group of countries than the UNFCCC), which 
required countries to bind themselves to sanctions, and which would also likely require 
modification of the current international trade regime. It is not clear why this would be 
less challenging or more likely to succeed than the UNFCCC process itself.  
The first club category would consist of countries with similar positions, and 
group processes are aimed at further these position; the second category suggest club’s 
activities that are aimed at innovation in specific technical fields; the third category 
suggests countries promoting informal dialogue between groups with opposing positions, 
and the category aims at an exclusive club based on implementing carbon-pricing with 
sanction mechanisms for non-compliant members. We have summarised these in the 
table below; the table is for illustrative purposes and is not comprehensive. 
Figure 2 Overview of current climate clubs  
Type of club Designation 
“Likeminded” 
political clubs 
Association of Small Island States (AOSIS ) 
Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)  
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) 
Arab Group 
African Group of Negotiators (AGN) 
Brazil, South Africa, India, China BASIC Group 
G77 + China 
Umbrella Group   
Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) 
Technical clubs/ 
innovation 
Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-lived Climate 
Pollutants (CCAC) 
Mitigation and MRV Partnership 
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REDD+ Partnership 







Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), previously 
Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change 
(MEM)  






Source: own compilation based on Weischer (2012), Widerberg and Stenson (2013), Pearce (2014) 
 
It is important to emphasise that membership of the first three categories is not exclusive, 
and that multiple membership is an important facet of the regime, and reflect the 
complexity of the interests at stake in the UNFCCC process. 
The technical achievements of the UNFCCC process thus far should not be 
underestimated. The regime complex which includes the UNFCCC and the IPCC has 
succeeded in developing an international reporting infrastructure on climate change, 
including emissions and national climate policy and programmes, which is critical to 
existing and future efforts to combat climate change. While the UNFCCC and 
specifically the Kyoto Protocol may have failed to deliver adequate emissions reductions, 
the regime has delivered a remarkable set of rules for reporting and transparency, which 
will form the basis for the post-2020 reporting and transparency institutional 
arrangements post-2020 under the Paris Agreement. Climate clubs could play a critical 
role in this process. 
 
3. South Africa’s national and international climate policy 
The goal of this section is outline South Africa’s domestic mitigation policy, its position 
in the international negotiations, and the relationship between the two, to assess a) the 
likelihood of South Africa participating in specific forms of club, and b) the likely impact 
of such participation on South Africa’s mitigation and other goals. The key dynamic 
governing the potential for more ambitious climate action in the country is the political-
economic tension between major stakeholders and policymakers, and amongst 
policymakers, on the speed and desirability of mitigation efforts. International 
commitments on the one hand are difficult to attain widespread political consensus on, 
within government and with stakeholders, and on the other hand, once made, provide a 
powerful source of legitimation for the implementation of mitigation measures or 
associated reporting and transparency obligations. 
South Africa’s emissions currently comprise around 1% of global emissions and, 
as alluded to above, are derived primarily from coal use, and around 80% of these are 
from energy use. The majority of these emissions are produced by large emitters, and 
                                                       
4 Russia’s membership of the G8 was suspended in 2014 on account of its role in Ukraine 
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over half of the country’s emissions are from just two emitters – Eskom, the state-owned 
electricity utility, and Sasol, a petrochemicals and synthetic fuels company. Without 
mitigation, coal-derived energy emissions would continue to comprise the overwhelming 
share of South Africa’s emissions in the long term. Reducing emissions would not only 
involve diversifying energy supply (away from coal to low-carbon sources), but would 
also involve the shifting of South Africa’s development path from its current trajectory – 
carbon and energy-intensive – to a low-carbon, less energy-intensive economy.  
South Africa’s lead government agency for the development and implementation 
of climate policy is the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA). DEA depends on a 
wide range of other agencies, and specifically key government departments, for detailed 
programme formulation and implementation. Of particular importance are the 
“economic” departments – the Departments of Energy, Trade and Industry, Economic 
Development, Public Enterprises (formally shareholders of Eskom, the state-owned 
electricity utility, and Transnet, the state-owned transport utility), and the National 
Treasury. The DEA and the Department of International Relations and Co-Operation 
(DIRCO) develop South Africa’s international negotiating position in the UNFCCC 
jointly. As will be elaborated below, South African domestic and international climate 
policy is the outcome of a complex “two-level game”5 – in addition to the strategic 
context of the UNFCCC, national tensions over mitigation, and what should comprise 
South Africa’s contribution are reflected in government, and international commitments 
have played a significant role in providing the political impetus for domestic mitigation 
programmes, and for the development of national reporting systems. 
  South Africa’s domestic climate policy was developed over a period of a decade, 
including a number of national consultative conferences and two long-term scenario 
processes (one for mitigation and one for adaptation) (Winkler 2007).  The process 
culminated in the 2011 National Climate Change Response Policy White Paper 
(NCCRWP), which balances national action on mitigation and adaptation (RSA 2011). 
The White Paper commits the country internationally to a fair contribution to the 
international effort to avoid dangerous climate change, and nationally to a just transition 
to a low-carbon, climate resilient development path, with central consideration of the 
country’s development needs, and especially job creation and poverty alleviation. 
South Africa’s mitigation policy is defined in the White Paper in emissions terms 
as a  “peak, plateau and decline” trajectory range, from 2010 to 2050, which consists of 
an upper and a lower bound. The upper end of the range peaks in 2025, remains at a 
plateau for a decade and begins to decline in 2035. The rationale for an emissions range 
was uncertainty in South Africa’s emissions baseline, and the range also provides a 
certain amount of policy flexibility. South Africa’s initial mitigation contribution 
announced at Copenhagen by President Zuma and subsequently communicated to the 
UNFCCC in the wake of Cancun, commits the country to restrict emissions to 34% 
below “Business As Usual (BAU)” in 2020, and 42% below “Business as Usual” in 2025. 
The South African communication was not clear at the time, and South Africa has not 
been clear since, on what “Business As Usual” emissions were implied, although this 
                                                       
5 Putnam (1988). 
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was clarified by implication in the NCCRWP and its accompanying technical 
information document. South Africa’s INDC confirms this reading of BAU for 2020 by 
specifying an emissions range for 2025 and 2030. Thus South Africa’s mitigation 
commitment for 2025 and 2030 is stated as an actual emissions level for 2025 and 2030, 
and an implied emissions level for 2020.  
The specific details of mitigation policy in the White Paper are that a) the overall 
national mitigation effort will be guided by the “national benchmark range” (the PPD); 
b) this will consists of a “carbon budget approach” whereby “Desired Emissions 
Reduction Outcomes” will be defined for each economic sector, and these will in the 
case of large emitters be “cascaded” to firm level – in other words, carbon budgets will be 
set for each large emitter; and c) a mix of other measures will be deployed to enhance the 
realisation of carbon budgets and to cover parts of the economy not covered by carbon 
budgets. In addition, economy-wide instruments such as a carbon tax will be considered.  
In practice, implementation of these measures has been very uneven. The upside 
of South African mitigation policy so far has been the Renewable Energy IPP 
Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), a large-scale renewables procurement programme 
in operation for the last few years, which has for the first time seen significant investment 
in South Africa in wind and solar power. Progress in other areas identified as key 
measures for mitigation, such as energy efficiency and transport, have been more uneven 
in terms of implementation, and what is now referred to in South Africa as the 
‘mitigation system’ (comprising all elements above, and including information and MRV 
systems) is still under development. Specifically, the carbon budget system and the tax, 
both primarily applicable to large emitters, have been very challenging to implement – 
government and large emitters have not been able to reach consensus on 
implementation, and government is unwilling, especially under current economic 
conditions in the country (stagnation, low international commodity prices, and low oil 
prices), 6 to take the political risk of imposing either of these measures without buy-in 
from business. Despite the publication of draft carbon tax legislation in 2015, the future 
of the carbon tax, especially in an environment in which low economic growth and low 
international commodity prices are putting additional pressure on large emitters, is 
uncertain. 
Aside from the success of the REIPPPP, which may have a large impact on 
South Africa’s emissions by 2030, two factors have had an impact on emissions growth 
in the short term. First, the economy has grown more slowly than predicted, and 
secondly, the electricity intensity of the economy has reduced significantly over the last 
seven years on account of rising electricity prices, and an electricity shortage. South 
Africa’s national inventory also reports a longer-term emissions intensity reduction in the 
period 2000-2010. As a result, South Africa will not struggle to meet its 2020 
commitment, but will require additional measures to meet future targets. DEA 
                                                       
6 Low oil prices internationally, while having a beneficial impact on South Africa’s trade balance, 
also result in low prices for liquid fuels, due to South Africa’s regulatory system. This in turn puts 
pressure on South Africa’s synthetic fuels industry, one of the country’s largest GHG emitters. 
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designated the period 2016-2020 as a pilot phase, during which the country’s emissions 
reporting system and also the carbon budget system for large emitters will be trialed. 
Domestic reticence to implementing current mitigation measures, and to aspiring 
to more ambitious mitigation goals, has a number of sources, including concerns about 
simultaneously meeting development goals, concerns about the international 
competitiveness of trade-exposed industries, and specifically commodities-based, energy-
intensive industries such as mining and minerals processing, and concerns about the 
difficulties of financing the massive infrastructure investments which would be required. 
On the other hand, South Africa has some of the best renewable energy resources in the 
world (wind, and particularly solar radiation), which have up to very recently remained 
largely unused. 
4. South Africa’s international position 
South African foreign policy pertaining to climate change follows four main cooperation 
lines: engagement with Africa, engagement with other major developing countries, 
participation in focused ‘great power’ fora such as the G20 and the Major Economies 
Forum, and bilateral engagements. 
The first cooperation lines focuses on the developing countries and especially 
other African countries. South Africa has been the largest economy on the continent for a 
long time, surpassed only recently by Nigeria. Its geopolitical position as a middle 
income country with mostly low income neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa has comprised 
an important element of South African foreign policy since the end of apartheid in 1994, 
particularly given the support rendered by many African states to the anti-apartheid 
movement, and the governing ANC specifically. Foreign policy under Nelson Mandela 
(1994-99) was largely a policy learning experience – the country emerged from 
international and especially regional isolation, and was welcomed internationally to 
various fora from which it had been excluded. Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, had a 
degree in international relations and was particularly active in shaping South Africa’s 
foreign policy agenda. Mbeki coined the concept of the ‘African Renaissance’ and which 
directed South African foreign policy towards focusing on Africa (Smith 2013). From a 
climate point of view, South Africa participates in three key ‘clubs’ – the African Union, 
the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), a regular meeting of 
African environment ministers which provides critical political guidance on the 
negotiations, and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), a regional grouping within 
the UNFCCC process. Since the majority of African countries are also LDCs, there is a 
significant overlap between the interests of LDCs and African countries from a climate 
point of view, with a key focus on vulnerability and adaptation, and less focus on 
mitigation. 
The second cooperation line allies South Africa with other middle-income 
developing countries, primarily outside Africa. This has primarily taken the form of 
participation in the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) group. While the newly-
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formed BRICS development bank may play a role in financing climate investments, 
BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, South Africa) explicitly does not tackle 
climate issues.  
The third cooperation line consists of South Africa’s participation in minilateral 
fora, of which the most important for climate change are the Major Economies Forum 
on Energy and Climate (MEF), the G8 / G7 +5 and the G20, which all consist of 
climate ‘great powers’ from developed and developing countries. 
The fourth cooperation line includes the various bilateral and multilateral 
engagements with the developed countries. The cooperation with the US, Australia, 
Japan, and the EU fall in this category. This aspect of foreign policy appears less 
dynamic than the first two, but is of equal importance. A third of South African trade 
and investment continues to flow to and from these countries (Moore 2013).  
The South African government is thus generally open towards multi- and 
minilateral cooperation generally and specifically in the climate space; this is partly 
because of the complex balancing act which the country has to perform between different 
spheres of influence with different interests – specifically between LDCs (Africa), major 
developing countries (BASIC) and developed countries. South African officials are fairly 
active in international organizations and attach importance to the prestige associated 
with participation in ‘great power’ fora. There is a tendency towards compliance with 
international norms, which has been observed in several policy areas (Black 1999). South 
Africa has historically been a strong proponent of the multilateral process under the 
UNFCCC, and has resisted any attempts to develop an alternative basis for an 
international climate regime. This does not preclude participation in a wide range of for a 
such as the G20 and the MEF, but South Africa’s participation has always been on the 
basis of an understanding that these fora in no way constitute alternatives to the 
UNFCCC. 
South Africa is currently involved in a wide range of clubs listed in the table above. 
Within the UNFCCC process, South Africa is involved in the G77+China as a 
developing country, and chaired the G77 in 2015, and crucially, during COP 21, and is 
also involved in the AGN and BASIC, as well as having strong bilateral relationships 
with a number of key climate actors. South Africa plays a co-ordinating role (with 
Germany and South Korea) in the Mitigation and MRV Partnership, and participates in 
other technical partnerships. South Africa is an active participant in the G7+5, the G20 
and the MEF. While the value of technical innovation is important, it is important to 
observe that none of these clubs provide any basis for the kind of increased ambition 
referred to in the literature.  
5. Prerequisites to joining a Climate Club for South Africa  
The previous sections identified the opportunities and constraints in South Africa’s 
international and domestic climate policies vis-à-vis clubs. We now establish the 
prerequisites for the country to join a climate club in relation to the four types of club 
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established earlier: 1) to develop and pursue common positions; 2) to develop consensus 
around specific technical areas, 3) to promote dialogue between “great powers” in a less 
formal setting on key issues 4) carbon-pricing clubs with the ability to penalize non-
compliant members and non-members. 
Of these options, we will focus on types (2) and (4), since clubs in (1) are well-
developed in the negotiations and focused on these, and several type (3) clubs are 
likewise established. It is worth noting again that none of the type 4 clubs exist at present. 
A prerequisite for club membership, which is reflected also in South Africa’s current 
participation in climate clubs, is that such membership does not conflict with the 
country’s current principles and practices on international climate engagement as 
outlined above. In brief, club memberships would have to lie within South Africa’s 
position on the legitimacy of the UNFCCC as the sole formal multilateral forum for the 
international climate regime, and also be consistent with South Africa’s climate-
diplomatic positioning. 
This would rule out any potential club, which seeks to replace rather than 
augment the UNFCCC. In the wake of the Paris Agreement, this is less relevant, since 
the Agreement provides much scope for individual or collective efforts in increase 
ambition at the discretion of individual Parties. In addition, South Africa’s involvement 
in the club would not be able to compromise the complex role that South Africa plays in 
relation to Africa, the G77 and other major developing countries (BASIC); in other 
words, South Africa would be unlikely to subscribe to a club which excluded other major 
developing countries, or is perceived as not meeting, or marginalising some of the 
aspirations of African countries in the climate regime. 
The potential benefits to South Africa fall into three categories. The first is 
perhaps politically the easiest to achieve, in an area of the international regime, which 
has traditionally been underemphasised, but was central to the Paris outcome – reporting 
and transparency. The 5-year national contribution cycles, combined with the global 
stocktake and the “ratcheting up” mechanism, are all dependent on the establishment 
and effective operation of credible and accurate national systems for reporting and 
transparency, which is a challenge especially for developing countries7. In addition to the 
capacity-building initiatives established under the PA and the UNFCCC, technical clubs 
focused on developing national systems, specifically those focused on sharing 
experiences between developing countries, could play a significant role in building the 
national systems mandated under the PA. Initiatives such as the Mitigation and MRV 
partnership are to a certain extent already playing this role. 
The second category of benefits are international forms of co-operation which could 
potentially increase South Africa’s mitigation ambition. These benefits could be provided 
via technically-focused clubs which could enhance specific programmes such as the 
REIPPPP in South Africa, via a set of measures possibly including enhanced access to 
                                                       
7 Obviously this encompasses a very wide range of countries with an equally wide range 
of national circumstances, but at the very least, reporting requirements for developing 
countries will increase after 2020, whereas those for developed countries will remain 
similar to pre-2020 arrangements. 
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finance, peer review and comparison of programmes and institutions, and possibly 
voluntary targets. The Solar Alliance launched by the governments of India and France 
in Paris during COP 21 may be an example of such a club. These initiatives would 
effectively lower the cost of mitigation measures, and provide a basis for accelerated 
action. Given the number of carbon-pricing or ETS initiatives now being implemented, 
especially in developing countries, it would also be potentially valuable to establish a 
process for swapping detailed national experiences on either establishing an ETS or a 
carbon tax, to facilitate policy learning in this complex area. 
The third category consists of benefits which would potentially lower or eliminate the 
consequences of imposing either a direct carbon price on the South African economy, or 
an indirect cost via other measures on trade-exposed sectors in the South African 
economy, which would address some of the concerns currently raised by domestic 
stakeholders related to the proposed introduction of a carbon tax. This could take the 
form of the kind of club envisaged by Nordhaus, which would impose border tax 
adjustments on commodities from non-member countries. In order for such a club to 
have such a benefit for South Africa, it would have to include both South Africa’s key 
trading partners as well as other commodity producers, which share markets with South 
African producers. The key economic impact of such a club from a South African point 
of view would be on the cost of producing energy-intensive trade-exposed basic 
commodities; since South Africa is primarily an exporter of such commodities rather 
than an importer (except potentially in the case of steel), the economic impact of such an 
arrangement would depend primarily on which other producers and consumers were 
included in such an arrangement, rather than South Africa’s ability to impose border tax 
adjustments (other than on steel). 
Even though the focus of the literature on clubs is primarily on mitigation, given 
the vital importance of adaptation, especially for vulnerable developing countries, there is 
scope for a process to share adaptation experience and practices similar to some of the 
technical clubs described above. 
The benefits of the above options for South Africa may be both political and 
financial, depending on the results of the negotiations of the club. The benefits of 
technical clubs might be more tangible and less contested. A technical focus of a club 
might motivate the government to contribute, as the political terrain is less contested. 
The South African international delegation to the UNFCCC is large and well 
capacitated. Yet, the community of researchers and experts on climate change in the 
country as a whole is quite small. Additional capacity for the pool of climate knowledge 
would benefit the country and the quality of efforts in climate protection. South Africa 
could play a role in pioneering peer review mechanisms under the UNFCCC to advance 
capacity in emissions management. Peer review between like-minded countries that 
allows for policy learning and technical exchange on implementation may be beneficial 
even at the policy level.  
The literature was quite clear that a low cost club is more likely to be successful 
than high cost options. The rules for membership would have to be very clear. The 
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exclusion of non-members at low cost is necessary, but the entry for interested non-
members should be possible and not exclusive through economic income, region etc.  
Fairness, size and the “likemindedness” are very important for the international 
legitimacy. This is a very important concern from a South African perspective. South 
African foreign policy is juggling between the three faces of developing country, an 
emerging economy with regional power and a reliable partner of the industrialized 
world. The club membership would have to allow South Africa to continue playing that 
role. Fairness applies to membership costs and criteria for benefits, access and 
conclusion. The members would also have to be selected to allow for a coherent 
representation of developing country interests if the focus is political or technical 
expertise if the focus is technical.  
 A small club might be more beneficial as long as the goals aren’t clearly defined. 
A small club with 2-20 members facilitates more productive outcomes, as we saw in the 
research literature earlier. This club size would apply to all three options.  
 
Figure 3 Prerequisites of a climate club from a South African / developing country perspective  
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There is a general mind-set and ambition to promote climate action and to play 
an international role between developing and developed countries along with like 
minded emerging economies across the relevant government departments, which 
motivates the delegation to play an active role in advancing climate action under the 
UNFCCC as well as in smaller groups.  
6. Conclusion 
South Africa has consistently played a pragmatic and progressive role in the climate 
negotiations, and would very likely be receptive to co-operative initiatives to enhance the 
implementation of the Paris Accord and further the development and implementation of 
the climate regime under the UNFCCC, especially initiatives which hold the promise of 
enhancing national implementation of South Africa’s INDC. Any initiative, which South 
Africa joined, would have to be consistent with foreign policy objectives and the balance 
between the interests of major developing countries and African countries which this 
reflects. 
In terms of the potential to enhance implementation and potentially mitigation 
ambition, the two types of club, which have been identified above are technical clubs 
focusing on reporting and transparency, and on technical mitigation initiatives, and 
carbon-pricing clubs. 
The latter type of club would potentially lower some of the domestic obstacles to 
the implementation of an effective carbon price in the South African economy, but it is 
likely that South Africa’s participation in such a club would also require the participation 
of the country’s key commodities trading partners and competitors in key commodities 
markets. Since such a club would likely involve the imposition of border tax adjustments, 
it would require both the negotiation of a WTO-like mechanism and set of rules between 
participating countries, and the necessary associated mechanisms, and also very likely a 
negotiation process within the WTO itself. Both of these may be more challenging than 
the current negotiations processes within the UNFCCC have proved to be. So far, any 
attempts to raise such initiatives within the UNFCCC have been strenuously resisted. It 
is very unlikely that South Africa would participate in such a club without the complex 
terrain between the UNFCCC and the WTO having been politically navigated by major 
economies in some way within the UNFCCC. 
An easier objective would be clubs focused on specific technical areas – reporting 
and transparency, mitigation and carbon pricing, with an emphasis on sharing 
experiences of policymaking and implementation, specifically between developing 
countries, to facilitate policy learning and innovation. Many countries, including South 
Africa, are currently putting in place the policy and institutional infrastructure to meet 
mitigation targets and establish low-carbon development trajectories, and a formal 
process of sharing this experience, especially between similar developing countries, could 
be extremely valuable, potentially coupled with a facilitative peer-review mechanism. 
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Elements of this approach already exist in the Mitigation and MRV Partnership, and in 
the Partnership for Market Readiness. 
Another variant of a technical club which South Africa would find attractive 
would be a technology-focused club aimed at accelerating implementation of low-carbon 
technologies such as renewable energy technologies, which would be aimed at a) sharing 
experience on institutional arrangements for planning and procurement; b) sharing 
experiences on key technical challenges, and c) enhancing access to finance. Effectively 
lowering the costs of such technologies (either directly via accelerated international 
investment, lowering risk and/or the cost of capital) would very likely accelerate the rate 
of investment in low-carbon technologies in the country. 
In conclusion – South Africa would very likely join and actively participate in 
implementation-oriented technical clubs, within the context of the overall UNFCCC 
climate regime, and would possibly consider membership of a carbon-pricing club, with 
very specific provisos concerning membership, and with the specific political obstacles 
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